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Despite the fact that Argentina has been suﬀering from a reces-
sion for years, the timing and severity of the recent currency crisis
surprised most observers. This paper analyzes the role of fundamen-
tals and self-fulﬁlling speculation in the Argentinean crisis. Arguing
within a theoretical model of a ﬁxed exchange rate system that allows
for multiple equilibria, we show that the crisis, while being associated
with weak and deteriorating fundamentals, cannot be explained by
these macroeconomic factors alone. Estimating a univariate Markov-
switching model, this paper shows that shifts in agents’ beliefs did
indeed also play a crucial role.
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11 Introduction
The Argentinean currency board, which had started with overwhelming
economic success, came to a sudden, harsh, and dramatic end. In January
2002, the period of the 1 ¡ to ¡ 1 peg between the US dollar and the
Argentinean peso was over and the peso depreciated dramatically. Despite
the fact that Argentina had been suﬀering from a recession for years, the
timing and severity of the recent currency crisis surprised most observers.
Until recently, there is no consensus concerning the concrete causes of
the Argentinean crisis. According to Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002), the
capital ﬂow retrenchment after the Russian crisis of 1998 created a major
real exchange rate misalignment and ﬁscal diﬃculties in Argentina. De
la Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002) ﬁnd that Argentina fell into
a growth-debt trap after 1998: when economic activity did not increase
and credit from abroad dried up, the crisis became unavoidable. Feldstein
(2002) argues that the crisis was due to exchange rate overvaluation and to
an extremely high amount of foreign debt. On the whole, literature on the
Argentinean crisis focuses on macroeconomic factors and so far has ignored
factors associated with the agents’ expectations and speculative behavior.
While several papers analyze the vulnerability of the Argentinean economy
prior to the crisis in a descriptive manner, proper empirical work has been
scarce.
Therefore, this paper contributes a new perspective on at least three
issues to the existing literature: First, the Argentinean crisis is analyzed
within a theoretical framework that allows for multiple equilibria (Jeanne
(1997)). An important feature of this model is that self-fulﬁlling expecta-
tions can arise only when the exchange rate arrangement has been under-
mined by weak fundamentals. Second, the empirical analysis is carried out
by estimating a univariate non-linear Markov-switching model (based on
Hamilton 1989) with two regimes. This model involves multiple structures
that can describe time series behavior in diﬀerent regimes. Thus it is able
to capture more complex, dynamic patterns. Third, the empirical results
2clearly show that shifts in agents’ beliefs could play a crucial role for the
collapse of the Argentinean currency board.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some
stylized facts concerning the economic development in Argentina are pre-
sented. Section 3 presents the model and Section 4 analyzes - based on this
model - the vulnerability of Argentina. In Section 5 the empirical approach
of the Markov-switching AR models is discussed. Section 6 presents the
empirical results. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a critical summary of
the results.
2 Stylized facts
After its introduction in 1991, the Argentinean currency board was ex-
tremely eﬀective: inﬂation came down soon and gross domestic product
went up. Until 1998 Argentina outperformed most other countries in the
region in terms of per capita growth. Furthermore, inﬂation dropped below
US rates.
Initial macroeconomic diﬃculties occurred in the aftermath of the Mex-
ican crisis of December 1994, but the Argentinean economy recovered rela-
tively quickly; in 1996 positive growth rates were reported again.1 However,
after the Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) crises and the devaluation of the
Brazilian real (1999), Argentina was drawn into the swirls of the chang-
ing climate on international ﬁnancial markets. Argentinean policy makers
faced a dilemma: in order to make the country attractive to international
investors, higher interest rates were necessary. However, increasing domes-
tic interest rates always have a restrictive impact on economic activity. In
this setting, GDP began to decrease (Figure A1).
Argentina had to face recession and deﬂation for a long period prior to
the crisis. Nevertheless, traditional indicators for currency crises did not
worsen signiﬁcantly during the pre-crisis period. In 2001 did the external
1In 1995 the authorities recognized the importance of a particularly resilient ﬁnancial
system and banking system reforms were introduced quickly.
3debt-to-exports ratio, which was high during the whole period of the cur-
rency board (Figure A2) reach its lowest level since 1997. Additionally, the
most prominent indicator for a currency crisis, the current account deﬁcit,
came down to less than 2 percent in 2001 (Figure A3). Thus, the current
account deﬁcit seemed to be sustainable in terms of its size. All in all, these
important crisis indicators did not send appropriate warning signals during
the immediate pre-crisis period.
3 Theoretical Considerations
The collapse of the Argentinean peso revived old debates about potential
causes, symptoms, and patterns of currency crises. According to the ﬁrst
generation models (Krugman (1979)), currency crises come about due to a
run on the international reserves, as speculators understand that the chosen
ﬁscal and monetary policy is inconsistent with the pegged exchange rate.
Thus, these theoretical models of ﬁxed exchange rates explain speculative
attacks against the domestic currency as a consequence of unsustainable
developments in the “fundamentals” of an economy - such as rapidly growing
budget deﬁcits, high inﬂation, large and growing current account deﬁcits,
etc. “Second generation models” recognize that there are both beneﬁts
and costs of maintaining a peg and that investors’ beliefs about whether a
peg will hold or not can aﬀect the government’s cost of defending it.2 In
these models, multiple equilibria and self-fulﬁlling crises may arise due to
their inherent circularity - investors’ expectations must be rational given
the government policy and conversely the policy makers’ behavior must be
optimal given the expectations of the investors.3
In the following, we argue within an analytical framework in which both
the fundamentals of an economy and self-fulﬁlling speculation might inﬂu-
ence the emergence of a currency crisis (Jeanne (1997)). According to this
2See, for seminal literature, Obstfeld (1986) and Obstfeld(1996).
3Integrating banking and currency crises is the major aim of the so-called third gen-
eration models, which emerged just after the Asian crisis.
4model of a ﬁxed exchange rate system, the government decides at each point
in time whether to defend the peg or not. It is assumed that the policy mak-
ers maintain the peg as long as the net beneﬁt of the exchange rate policy
is positive. The net beneﬁt (Bt) depends on the gross beneﬁt of the ﬁxed
peg (bt) and on the probability evaluated by the private sector at “t ¡ 1”
that the currency will be devaluated at “t” (¼t¡1):
Bt = bt ¡ ®¼t¡1: (1)
The gross beneﬁt (bt) is an exogenous variable reﬂecting the fundamentals
of the economy. It is assumed that the innovation in bt:
²t = bt ¡ Et¡1bt (2)
is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾2. Thus, the innova-
tion ² is characterized by a continuous and symmetric density function f(¢)
and is strictly increasing resp. decreasing in (¡1;0) resp. (0;+1).
Investors’ expectations must be rational given the government’s policy.
At the same time the policy maker’s behavior must be optimal given the
expectations of the investors. Thus, the probability of devaluation in the
current period is equal to the probability that the net beneﬁt of the peg is
negative in t+1:
¼t ´ Probt[Bt+1 < 0] = Probt[²t+1 < ®¼t ¡ Etbt+1]: (3)
Letting Át (= Etbt+1) represent all exogenous economic variables that in-
ﬂuence the determination of the devaluation probability at t, equation (3)
corresponds to
¼t = F(®¼t ¡ Át) (4)
where F(¢) represents the cumulative distribution of f(¢). There might be
multiple solutions, since both the left and the right hand side of the equation
depend positively on ¼t, which means that a given level of the variable Át
might be consistent with several levels of the devaluation probability ¼t.
5As Jeanne (1997) shows, there are two necessary conditions for the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria.4 First, the slope of the cumulative distribution
F(®¼t¡Át), when reaching its maximum (which corresponds to ®f(0)), has
to be larger than one:5
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range (i.e. Át ² (Á;Á).7 This range allowing for multiple equilibria is deter-
































To resume, self-fulﬁlling speculation may arise when the structural pa-
rameters of the economy allow for multiple equilibria in market expectations
and when the fundamentals of the economy lie within a certain interval.
Then a jump from a “low” to a “high” devaluation probability may or may
not happen, depending on the “animal” spirits of the market.
4In the case of multiple equilibria, the devaluation probability may take three diﬀerent
values. For an explanation see also Jeanne (1997).
5If in contrast the slope of the cumulative distribution is smaller than one everywhere,
i.e. z < 1, the devaluation probability is uniquely determined by Át and decreases with
it.
6See Jeanne (1997) for the proof based on a graphical representation of equation (4).
7If in contrast the fundamentals are very good (i.e. Á > Á), the devaluation probability
is uniquely deﬁned and close to zero. Accordingly, if the fundamentals are very bad (i.e.
Á < Á), the devaluation probability is also uniquely deﬁned and close to one.
64 How vulnerable was Argentina?
In the years preceding the Argentinean crisis, fundamentals were weak for
an extended period of time. Nevertheless there were no warning signals in-
dicating a further worsening of these macroeconomic conditions prior to the
crisis. As a consequence, the concrete timing of the Argentinean currency
crisis surprised most observers. Can the currency crisis be explained by a
shift in expectations? Using the theoretical framework presented above, the
following question arises: Were the conditions necessary for the existence of
multiple equilibria fulﬁlled?
Therefore, we ﬁrst have to prove whether the slope of the cumulative
distribution F(®¼t ¡ Át) is larger than one (at its maximum). As does
Masson (1998), we deﬁne ® as the product of foreign debt (D) and the
expected devaluation size (±):
® = ±D:8 (8)
Under this assumption we calculate z as in the model of Jeanne. Table 1
shows the results. Indeed, z > 1 holds during the pre-crisis period. Thus,
the ﬁrst condition necessary for the existence of multiple equilibria is satis-
ﬁed.
Second, we have to prove whether the fundamentals lie within the range
of multiple equilibria. For this purpose we approximate the vulnerability of
the Argentinean economy as in Masson (1998):
Át = E(TBt) + Rt ¡ R ¡ r
?
tDt (9)
where E(TBt) is the expected value from trade balance as a percentage of
GDP, Rt the level of international reserves as a percentage of GDP, R the
threshold value of international reserves (in the following assumed to be
zero), r? the foreign interest rate (U.S. rate) and Dt the external debt as a
percentage of GDP.9 In order to approximate the expected value from trade
8Following Masson, the expected devaluation size ± is assumed to be 25 percent. An
estimation for ¾ results from the regression of an autoregressive process (see below).
9The following variables can be motivated by a simple balance of payment model.
7Table 1: Argentina’s vulnerability
Year Dt Rt TBt r?
t zt Át Át Át
1995 38.42 5.53 -0.43 5.51 1.80 2.57 7.03 3.11
1996 40.64 6.65 -0.67 5.02 1.90 2.75 7.42 4.13
1997 42.70 7.62 -2.24 5.07 2.00 2.91 7.76 3.85
1998 47.48 8.28 -2.55 4.81 2.22 3.38 8.49 4.16
1999 51.24 9.26 -1.75 4.66 2.40 3.74 9.07 5.62
2000 51.49 8.85 -0.64 5.84 2.41 3.76 9.11 5.39
2001 52.21 5.41 1.24 3.45 2.44 3.83 9.22 4.51
balance, an autoregressive process of order one for TBt from 1992 to 2001
is estimated.10 The standard error of the regression is taken as an estimate
for ¾, i.e. the standard deviation of innovations to trade balance.
Looking at Table 1, we see at a glance that the second condition neces-
sary for the existence of multiple equilibria is also fulﬁlled. On the whole it
is shown that Argentina was highly vulnerable long before the crisis.
5 Empirical Approach: The Non-linear Markov-
switching AR models
In the empirical literature on currency crises, in the majority of cases, the
role of country-speciﬁc economic fundamentals in causing currency crises is
estimated by using a linear function. However, an important shortcoming
of estimating a linear function is that it ignores the possibility that shifts
in expectations and private sector beliefs may also cause crises (Fratzscher
(2002)). Since the determinants of these changes tend to be unobservable,
it is very diﬃcult to develop an appropriate empirical method. Thus, using
a Markov-switching model might be helpful. In this class of models it is
10Quarterly data are used.
8assumed that the parameters of the underlying data generating process of
the observed time series depend on an unobservable state variable.
The Markov-switching model, also known as regime switching model,
developed by Hamilton (1989), is one of the most popular non-linear time
series models. In this model, non-linearities arise if processes are confronted
with discrete shifts in regime. By permitting switching between these N
regimes, in which the dynamic behavior of series is markedly diﬀerent, more
complex dynamic patterns can be characterized. The switching mechanism
is controlled by an unobservable state variable that follows a ﬁrst-order
Markov chain. Thus, the probability that the state variable st equals some
particular value j depends on the past only through the most recent value
st¡1:11
Pfst = jjst¡1 = i;st¡2 = k;:::g = Pfst = jjst¡1 = ig = pij: (10)
As such, a structure may prevail for a random period of time, and will be
replaced by another structure when switching takes place. The transition
probability pij gives the probability that state i will be followed by state j.
Clearly, the transition probabilities satisfy pi1 + pi2 + ::: + piN = 1.12 They
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In the following we will focus on a two-regime Markov-switching AR
model of order p (MS(2)-AR(p) model). In the most general speciﬁcation
of this model, all parameters of the autoregressions are conditioned on the





v1 + a11yt¡1 + ::: + ap1yt¡p + u1t if st = 1
v2 + a12yt¡1 + ::: + ap2yt¡p + u2t if st = 2
11For a more extensive discussion of Markov chains, see Hamilton (1994).
12A limitation of Hamilton’s model is that the transition probabilities are assumed to
be exogenous and constant over time.
9with ut » NID(0;¾2
st). As the above MS(2)-AR(p) model illustrates, Markov-
switching models can be speciﬁed with regime dependent autoregressive
parameters, a regime dependent mean or intercept, and with hetero- or ho-
moskedastic error terms . Furthermore, observable exogenous variables can
be included in the system.13 However, for empirical application it may be
better to use a model where only some parameters depend on the state of the
Markov chain. There are diﬀerent ways to estimate the Markov-switching
model; see for example Hamilton (1990) and Kim and Nelson (1999). In
this paper, a Markov-switching model is estimated by implementing the
Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm, programmed in Ox.14
6 Empirical Results
Using a non-linear Markov-switching model allows us to analyze the dynam-
ics of the devaluation probability in Argentina. The estimation results are
interpreted, within the theoretical framework of the currency crisis model
described above, taking regime shifts as jumps between diﬀerent devalu-
ation probabilities. According to the theoretical model, these jumps are
generated by shifts in expectations of investors.
To prove whether shifts in expectations of private investors inﬂuenced
the Argentinean crisis of 2002, we estimate a Markov-switching model with
two regimes.15 The exogenous shifts in expectations are modelled as switch-
ing autoregressive parameters and changes in the error variance [i.e., we esti-
mate a MSAH (2) ARX (1) model]. The devaluation probability is assumed
to be a function of the pressure at the exchange market. This is measured
13In that case the system is denoted MS(M)-VARX(p). A broad discussion of systems
with exogenous variables is given by Krolzig (1997).
14A wide class of Markov-switching models can be estimated by using this program
written by Hans-Martin Krolzig. The EM algorithm was ﬁrst introduced by Dempster,
Laird, and Rubin (1977). It is designed for a general class of models, in which the
observed time series depends on some unobservable stochastic variables.
15A model with two regimes is estimated, since within the theoretical model presented
above, two of the three equilibria are dynamically stable. See also Jeanne(1997).
10by an index of speculative pressure constructed as a weighted average of
monthly exchange rate changes (∆e), interest diﬀerential changes (∆i¡i?)
and international reserve changes (∆R):
Index of pressure ´ ´(∆e) + '(∆(i ¡ i
?)) ¡ Ã(∆R) (11)
with ´, ' and Ã as weights and i? as the US interest rate. The weights are
calculated as the inverse of the series’ standard deviation in the past.16
A broad set of fundamentals, which are usually expected to inﬂuence
the probability of devaluation, is employed:
² Capital account indicators: international reserves, ratio of broad money
to gross international reserves, exchange rate between the Argentinean
peso and the Brazilian real.
² Current account indicators: exports, imports.
² Financial sector indicators: stock of commercial bank deposits, do-
mestic credit, ratio of lending to deposit rate, M1.
² Real sector indicator17: output.
Our sample includes monthly data between January 1994 and December
2001, the longest period for which appropriate data is available during the
Argentinean currency board.18 We use ﬁrst diﬀerences of all variables, which
are stationary. To check this, ADF- and Perron-Tests are executed.
After excluding variables which were insigniﬁcant in both regimes, we
get the results presented in Table 2. All variables, with the exception of
M1, have the expected sign.
16Indices of speculative pressure have been used in various studies, including Eichen-
green, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
17Unfortunately, the Argentinean unemployment rate, which is theoretically expected
to inﬂuence the costs of the ﬁxed exchange rate system, was not available.
18Data are taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF as well as from
national statistics.
11Table 2: Estimation results
Regime 1 Regime 2
Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Index of Pressure(-1) 0.1591 1.88 -0.72 -8.88
M2/Reserves 0.012 11.66 0.002 1.8
M2/Reserves(-1) 0.001 0.072 0.011 6.97
Bank Deposits -0.011 -3.285 -0.084 -17.48
Domestic Credit -0.005 -1.15 0.035 5.23
Imports 0.002 0.355 0.012 14.33
M1 0.003 2.28 -0.013 -7.533
Output (-7) -0.001 -0.977 -0.02 -7.57
log-likelihood (MSAH) 585.3137
log-likelihood (linear) 521.2686
For the sake of comparison, we also included the log likelihood of a linear
regression of the index of pressure. The higher log likelihood of the Markov-
switching model suggests that this model performs signiﬁcantly better than
the linear regression.19
The estimated matrix of transition probabilities shows that two fairly










Figure (1) exhibits the ﬁltered and the smoothed probabilities of being
in regime 1 or regime 2.20 Regime 1 is a so-called “tranquil” regime, during
19Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be formally tested using the usual likelihood
ratio test since one of the regularity conditions necessary for this test does not hold
(Hamilton, 1994, 1996).
20The ﬁltered probability estimates are based on information up to time point t. In
contrast the smoothed probability estimates use full sample information to make an
inference about the unobserved regimes.
12which the probability of devaluation is low, whereas Regime 2 represents
times of high economic tensions and reﬂects periods during which the de-
valuation probability is considerably higher. This is reﬂected also in the
fact that many of the variables, which seem to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the devaluation probability in Regime 2, are not signiﬁcant in Regime 1.
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Figure 1: Probabilities of Regime 1 and Regime 2
The ﬁgure shows that several shifts between the regimes took place over
time. What might have caused these shifts in expectations? Can we detect
any exogenous shocks?
The results present a shift of regimes in 1995. Regime 2, the one with
the higher devaluation probability, was then in eﬀect for about six months.
Indeed, 1995 was a diﬃcult year for the Argentinean currency board. In
December 1994 the Mexican crisis emerged, aﬀecting the whole region. In
this context, the Argentinean currency came under pressure and a domestic
banking crisis occurred in 1995. As a consequence of the domestic and inter-
national turmoil, the Argentinean currency board was softened. This policy
decision can be interpreted as a temporary abandonment of the pegged ex-
change rate regime. In other words, Argentina was suﬀering from several
characteristics of a currency crisis in 1995. Nevertheless, no depreciation
13took place. And, as Figure (1) shows, a switch back to Regime 1 occurred
after several months.
Analyzing the next years, only short term shifts from Regime 1 to
Regime 2 can be detected. These shifts in expectations can be explained
mainly as the consequences of external shocks: the Asian crisis in 1997 and
the Russian crisis of 1998 led to new evaluations of emerging economies
from the perspective of international investors. In 1999 it was certainly the
Brazilian currency crisis which lead to the regime shift. However, a com-
mon feature of all these external shocks is that they had only a short-term
inﬂuence on the devaluation expectations. In all these cases Regime 1, the
regime with low devaluation probability, soon regained force.
A last important shift in expectations took place in the second half of
2001. How can this shift be explained? There was no international ﬁnan-
cial crisis abroad, which could have inﬂuenced a shift in expectations of
investors. Thus, domestic factors must have played a crucial role. Look-
ing at Argentina in 2001, several factors can be found which might have
supported the view that the depreciation of the peso became unavoidable:
First, the political chaos resulted in several replacements of economic min-
isters. Second, in June 2001, a dual exchange rate was introduced. Third,
a new construction of the currency board was approved by congress. This
reconstruction was designed as a weighted peg of the peso to both the US
dollar and the euro. Fourth, in the last few months of 2001, several forms
of quasi-money were introduced, which was a clear indicator that the cur-
rency board was drying out. Since there were no impulses for a re-switch
to Regime 1, the Argentinean currency board came under more and more
pressure. In January 2002, the government did not see any alternative to
the abolition of the pegged exchange rate. Immediately the peso depreci-
ated sharply and Argentina was sucked into the maelstrom of a currency
crisis.
147 Conclusions
The fundamentals in Argentina were weak over a long period prior to the
currency crisis of 2002. Arguing within the model of Jeanne, we have shown
that from 1995 onwards, Argentina’s fundamentals were within the zone of
multiplicity and self-fulﬁlling speculation could arise. According to Jeanne,
switches between multiple equilibria, leading to a change in the devaluation
probabilities, are caused by changes in the expectations of private investors.
In the empirical part of this paper we estimated a Markov-switching
model with two regimes. Regime shifts are assumed to reﬂect changes in
expectations. We show that there are two diﬀerent regimes. In fact, Ar-
gentina was subject to several shifts in expectations over time. During the
years 1996 to 2000, all switches to the regime with the higher devaluation
probability - Regime 2 - were short-term switches; i.e. a switch to Regime 2
was always accompanied by a rapid switchback to Regime 1. The situation
was totally diﬀerent in the immediate period prior to the crisis of 2002: now
Regime 2 was persistent; no re-switching was observable. This persistence
of Regime 2 is the major diﬀerence between this and other periods.
All in all, it appears to be legitimate to assume that a shift in expecta-
tions had an important inﬂuence on the occurrence of the currency crisis in
Argentina. Additionally, the length of the period during which the regime
with the higher devaluation probability is in eﬀect seems to play an impor-
tant role for the occurrence of a currency crisis - at least in Argentina.
There are several interesting directions in which this study could be ex-
tended. We have argued within a Markov-switching model with constant
transition probabilities and assumed that regime shifts are due to shifts
in expectations. However, it remains an open question whether external
factors (contagion) and/or domestic events (political factors) have inﬂu-
enced expectations of investors in an empirically measurable way. For this
purpose, a Markov-switching model with time-varying transition probabil-
ity would have to be estimated. In addition , analyzing a broader set of
currency crises would be a natural extension of this study.
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